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I. Introduction
The Conservative Party won Canada's federal elections in January 2006 for the first
time in twelve years.' Stephen Harper was sworn in as the twenty-second Prime Minister
of Canada on February 6, 2006, succeeding Liberal Party leader Paul Martin. Shortly
after taking office, on April 27, 2006, Prime Minister Harper announced agreement on
the basic terms of a Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA or the Agreement) with the
United States, which was signed on September 12, 2006 and entered into force on Octo-
ber 12, 2006. This article will review the developments behind the Agreement. In addi-
tion, the article will review new developments in foreign investment law, proposed
amendments to The Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act,
amendments to the Ontario Securities Act, and recent Supreme Court decisions.
H. Canada - U.S. Softwood Lumber Agreement
Canada and the United States signed the SLA on September 12, 2006.2 Following
substantial amendments, the Agreement entered into force on October 12, 2006.3 It re-
mains unclear, however, whether the SLA is the final chapter in a dispute that has lasted
over twenty-five years.4
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1. The new government has a minority position in the House of Commons with 125 seats to the Liberals'
102.
2. See Softwood Lumber Agreement, U.S.-Can., Sept. 12, 2006, 35 I.L.M. 1195 [hereinafter Agreement].
3. See Agreement Between The Government of Canada And The Government of The United States of
America Amending The Softwood Lumber Agreement Between The Government of Canada And The Gov-
ernment of The United States of America Done At Ottawa On 12 September 2006, U.S.-Can., Oct. 12, 2006
[hereinafter Amended Agreement].
4. The current dispute dates back to 1982, when the U.S. lumber industry initially petitioned the U.S.
Government for imposition of countervailing duties against imports of Canadian softwood lumber.
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Canada and the United States previously signed an agreement in 1996 governing the
importation of softwood lumber from Canada. 5 That agreement expired on March 31,
2001. The following business day, the U.S. lumber industry filed a petition with the U.S.
Department of Commerce (Commerce) and the U.S. International Trade Commission
(ITC), alleging it was materially injured by dumped and subsidized imports of Canadian
softwood lumber. 6 On May 22, 2002, Commerce imposed antidumping (AD) and coun-
tervailing duties (CVD) on imports of softwood lumber from Canada.7 From the Cana-
dian perspective the duties were protectionist and unlawful measures, improperly
requiring its exporters to deposit millions of dollars each day with the U.S. Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection (U.S. Customs). Canadian industry requested reviews of
the U.S. agency determinations by North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
binational panels and U.S. federal courts, while the Canadian Government challenged the
actions under the World Trade Organization's (WTO) dispute settlement system. By the
end of 2006, most of the pending cases either were concluded or near resolution.
A. LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN 2006
Decisions in two cases in March and April of 2006 precipitated the announcement of
the Agreement. In March 2006, a NAFTA binational panel's unanimous ruling appeared
to settle in Canada's favor the issue of whether the Canadian softwood lumber industry
was being unfairly subsidized by Canadian provincial governments. In its original investi-
gation in 2001-02, Commerce found that the Canadian lumber industry was unfairly sub-
sidized and imposed a CVD order on imports of Canadian softwood lumber.8
Subsequently, however, a NAFTA panel formed to review the Commerce determination
found that Commerce had not properly calculated the subsidy rate in its original investi-
gation and remanded the case for reconsideration. This sequence was repeated five times.
Each time, on remand, Commerce recalculated the subsidy rate but still found that the
Canadian lumber industry was unfairly subsidized. After the fifth remand, however, Com-
merce finally determined that the Canadian subsidy rate on softwood lumber was suffi-
ciently low so as to be de minimis, a rate which Commerce must disregard in making a
CVD determination.9 In March 2006, the NAFTA panel upheld Commerce's
determination.' 0
On April 7, 2006, the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) ruled that U.S. Customs
violated the NAFTA Implementation Act in applying the Continued Dumping and Sub-
sidy Offset Act of 2000, commonly referred to as the Byrd Amendment, to AD and CVD
5. See Canadian Exports of Softwood Lumber, 61 Fed. Reg. 28,626 (une 5, 1996).
6. See Notice of Initiation of Antidumping Duty Investigation: Certain Softwood Lumber Products from
Canada, 66 Fed. Reg. 21,328, 21,331 (Apr. 30, 2001).
7. See Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 67 Fed. Reg. 36,068-70 (May 22, 2002) (provid-
ing notice of amended final determination of sales at less than fair value, of antidumping duty order, and of
amended final affirmative countervailing duty determination and notice of countervailing duty order).
8. Id. at 36,069.
9. See 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 167 1b(b)(4)(A), 167 1d(a)(3). If Commerce in its investigation determines that a
countervailable subsidy is not being provided, it must terminate the investigation. See 19 U.S.C.S.
§ 167 1d(g)(2).
10. See Certain Softwood Lumber Products From Canada, Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Deter-
mination, USA-CDA-2002-1904-03 (Mar. 17, 2006) (Fifth Remand Determination).
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duties on goods from Canada and Mexico. 1' The Byrd Amendment directs U.S. Customs
to distribute collected AD and CVD duties to affected domestic producers that supported
the petition for the investigation. By finding that the NAFTA Implementation Act for-
bade application of the Byrd Amendment to Canadian goods, the CIT effectively ruled
that the U.S. lumber industry would not be entitled to any of the more than $5 billion in
duties collected on imports of softwood lumber from Canada since May 2002. The basic
terms of the SLA were announced shortly after this decision on April 27, 2006.
However, the litigation continued. On July 21, 2006, the CIT issued a decision in
Tembec v. United States,12 which found unlawful the U.S. Government's amendment of the
AD and CVD orders to base them on an ITC affirmative Section 129 determination.13
That latter determination was made by the ITC under Section 129 of the Uruguay
Rounds Agreements Act,14 purportedly to bring the United States into compliance with a
prior adverse WTO panel decision. 15 The U.S. Government used that attempted amend-
ment to keep the AD and CVD orders in place notwithstanding the negative ITC deter-
mination on remand in 2004 that resulted from the appeal of the original case to a
NAFTA panel. 16 On October 13, 2006, one day after the SLA went into effect, the CIT
issued its remedy decision and final judgment in Tembec v. United States ordering the U.S.
Government to refund all cash deposits collected since the imposition of the AD and
CVD orders in 2002.17 The CIT expressly rejected the U.S. Government's argument that
11. See Canadian Lumber Trade Alliance v. United States, 425 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006). To
bring U.S. law into conformity with its WTO obligations, the U.S. Congress enacted legislation to terminate
the distribution under the Byrd Amendment of AD and CVD duties on merchandise that enters the United
States after September 30, 2007. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675c, repealed by Deficit and Reduction Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-171, § 7601.
12. See Tembec, Inc. v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006). In the original investi-
gation, the ITC found no present injury to the U.S. industry. See Softwood Lumber from Canada (Final),
USITC Pub. 3740, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-414, 73 1-TA-928 (Nov. 24, 2004).
13. See Softwood Lumber from Canada, supra note 12.
14. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 129, 108 Stat. 4809, 4836-39 (1994),
codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3538 (2000).
15. See Panel Report, United States-Investigation of the International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber
from Canada, WT/DS277/R (Mar. 22, 2004). The WTO panel found that the United States complied with
its decision; however the WTO Appellate Body reversed. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Investi-
gation of the International Trade Commission in Softwood Lumber from Canada, WT/DS277/AB/RW (May 9,
2006).
16. See Softwood Lumber from Canada, USITC Pub. 3815, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-414, 731-TA-928 (Sept. 10,
2004) (Negative Remand Determination). The NAFTA panel affirmed the Negative Remand Determination
and the Extraordinary Challenge Committee (ECC) dismissed the U.S. challenge to the NAFTA panel's
decision. See Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, 69 Fed. Reg. 69,584-85 (Nov. 30, 2004); In
the Matter of Certain Softwood Lumber Prods. from Canada, ECC-2004-1904-01-USA, Opinion and Order
of the ECC (Aug. 10, 2005).
17. See Tembec, Inc. v. United States, No. 05-00028, slip op. 06-152 (Ct. Int'l Trade Oct. 13, 2006). The
U.S. Government moved for reconsideration and to vacate the final judgment claiming the case was moot,
due to the SLA, when the final judgment was entered on October 13, 2006. See Motion for Reconsideration
and to Vacate, filed by the U.S. Government on Nov. 13, 2006. The Canadian industry, the Government of
Canada and the four largest provinces opposed that motion arguing that the final judgment resolved a live
case and controversy that still existed on October 13, 2006. See, e.g., Opposition to Motion for Reconsidera-
tion and to Vacate, filed by the Government of Canada et al., on November 25, 2006. The court denied the
U.S. motion for reconsideration and to vacate on February 28, 2007. See Tembec Inc. v. United States, No.
05-00028, slip op. 07-28 (Ct. Int'l Trade Feb. 28, 2007). The Court vacated its judgment as no longer
necessary, but expressly left its decision in place. Id.
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NAFTA panel decisions have prospective effect only. Consequently, all of the illegally
collected cash deposits had to be returned and not just those made after the effective date
of the final NAFTA panel decision in November 2004.
B. THE AGREEMEN-T
The United States agreed to revoke the AD and CVD orders and refund all cash depos-
its collected since May 2002; Canada agreed to distribute $1 billion to U.S. interests,
including $500 million to the petitioning U.S. industry.' 8 The net return to the Canadian
industry is approximately $4.4 billion out of the $5.4 billion in duties deposited with U.S.
Customs since 2002. The Agreement guarantees that, with certain exceptions, no new
trade cases will be filed for at least three. years, which is one year after the earliest time
when the Agreement can be terminated. 19
Canada also agreed to implement an export tax of up to 22.5 percent in place of the
current U.S. import duty of 10.7 percent; the export tax would kick in when the price of
lumber falls below $355 per thousand board feet.20 The SLA also permits the Canadian
regions to elect a volume constraint that would lower the export tax.21
The terms of the SLA, signed on September 12, 2006, required the support of compa-
nies accounting for 95 percent of all cash deposits on import entries of Canadian softwood
lumber and the termination of all ongoing litigation. 22 The implementation initially was
delayed from October 1, 2006, to November 1, 2006, as the Canadian Government did
not appear to have sufficient support from its industry.2 3 Behind the scenes, however, the
two governments secretly amended the SLA to eliminate those pre-conditions and imple-
mented the Agreement on October 12, 2006.24
18. See Agreement, supra note 2, at arts. ImI (revocation), IV (refund) ($500 million was earmarked for the
U.S. Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports (the petitioners), $450 million to fund "meritorious initiatives," and
$50 million for a new binational industry council). The U.S. Trade Representative announced that "meritori-
ous initiatives" money will go to Habitat for Humanity, the American Forest Foundation, and a newly created
U.S. Endowment for Forestry and Communities. See Peter Morton, Softwood Pact to Benefit Select Charities:
US$450-million Fund, FINANCIAL PosTr, Oct. 14, 2006.
19. See Agreement, supra note 2, at art. XX.
20. Id. at art. VII. At a price of $355 or above, the export tax does not apply. As the price drops, the tax
escalates up to the maximum of 15%, which is applied at a price of $315 or lower. Id. The cash price of
lumber on October 12, 2006, ranged between $250 and $252 per thousand board feet. See Allan Dowd,
Canada Says Trade Deal Not to Blame for Lumber Woe, REUTERS NEWS, Oct. 12, 2006. Consequently, at the
time of implementation of the SLA, Canadian exporters were required to pay the maximum 15% tax. How-
ever, the Agreement provides for an additional surcharge of 50% of the export tax to be applied on a retroac-
tive basis should the volume of exports from the relevant region exceed specific levels based on monthly U.S.
consumption for the prior year. See Agreement, supra note 2, at art. VIII.
21. See Agreement, supra note 2, at art. VII. For example, when the price of lumber is below $315 the
export tax is 5%-as opposed to 15% with no volume restraint-but the maximum volume that can be
exported to the United States from that region is that region's pro rata share of 30% of expected U.S. con-
sumption for the month. The regions for purposes of the Agreement are the British Columbia Coast, the
British Columbia Interior, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec.
22. See Agreement, supra note 2, at art. II & Annex 2A.
23. See, e.g., Softwood Lumber Pact Snagged on a Catch-22: The Deadline is Three Days Away; The Parties Are
Hung up on Faith, Money and Litigation. Odds en Success Are Between Remote and Zers, THE VANCOUVER SUN,
Sept. 28, 2006.
24. See Amended Agreement, supra note 3, at arts. I, III, Annex 2A.
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Upon its announcement in April 2006, the Agreement was opposed by the Liberal Party
and many members of the Canadian lumber industry.25 The conservative government
needed the support of the Bloc Quebecois (Bloc) to obtain temporary approval of the SLA
in the Canadian Parliament. The Bloc, with fifty-one votes in the House of Commons,
accepted the deal in September 2006,26 assuring the passage of the Ways and Means Mo-
tion that procedurally allowed the SLA's export tax to be implemented temporarily pend-
ing a vote in the Parliament.2 7 The SLA was formally approved by both chambers of the
Parliament and received Royal Assent on December 14, 2006.
IM. Investment Canada Act
A. XSTRATA/FALCONBRI DGE
Most non-Canadian companies considering acquisitions in Canada are aware that their
transactions may be subject to the notification and substantive review provisions of the
Competition Act. However, it often comes as a rude surprise to foreign acquirers that
they may also have to contend with the Investment Canada Act (ICA), Canada's foreign
investment review legislation.28
Where the statutory thresholds are met, the ICA requires non-Canadians acquiring
Canadian businesses to obtain pre-closing approval from Canada's Minister of Industry
or, if the transaction involves the acquisition of a "cultural" business, from the Minister of
Canadian Heritage. 29
Reviewable investments are assessed by the responsible Minister to determine if they
are of "net benefit" to Canada. 30 Although transactions are rarely denied approval, the
time required to complete the ICA process may become an issue where pre-closing ap-
25. See, e.g., Steve Mertl, Softwood Deals Set to Go Oct. 12, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Oct. 6, 2006.
26. See INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 15, 2006, Aug. 18, 2006.
27. Tiiw GLOBF AND MAIL, Sept. 11, 2006. The Ways and Means Motion (Bill C-24) implements the
Canadian export tax as directed by the SLA.
28. Investment Canada Act, R.S.C., ch. 28 (1985) (1st Supp.), available at http://Aaws.justice.gc.ca/en/I-
21.8/.
29. Id. §§ 14-14.1. The ICA's thresholds for review are largely based on the value of the assets of the
Canadian business being acquired and will vary depending on whether: (i) the acquiror or the vendor qualifies
as a "TO Investor" under the ICA (i.e., is controlled by citizens of VTO member countries); (ii) the
acquisition of control of the Canadian business is direct or indirect (the latter involving the acquisition of a
foreign corporation with a Canadian subsidiary); and (iii) the Canadian business is engaged in certain pre-
scribed industries (cultural businesses, transportation services, financial services or uranium mining). Thus,
the direct acquisition of a Canadian business by or from a VTO investor will be subject to review if the assets
of the Canadian business exceed $265 million (Cdn.) in value (this is the threshold for 2006; it is adjusted
annually). On the other hand, indirect acquisitions involving V/TO investors are not reviewable. The
thresholds are much lower if non-WTO investors or the prescribed industries referred to above are involved:
$5 million for direct investments and $50 million for indirect investments (these thresholds do not change
annually). In some circumstances, investments in cultural businesses can be reviewable even if they fall below
these thresholds.
30. Id. § 16. The ICA sets out a series of criteria which the Minister may consider in making the "net
benefit" determination, including: the effect of the investment on the level and nature of economic activity
and employment in Canada; the degree and significance of participation by Canadians in the Canadian busi-
ness; the compatibility of the investment with national industrial, economic and cultural policies; the contri-
bution of the investment to Canada's ability to compete in world markets; and the effect of the investment on
competition. See id. § 20.
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proval is required (there is an initial review period of forty-five days, but this may be
extended in more complex cases). Moreover, it has become common practice for the re-
sponsible Minister to extract "undertakings" from foreign investors as a condition of ap-
proval. These undertakings can be extensive and costly. Typically, they involve, among
other things, commitments to retain a certain level of employment in relation to the Ca-
nadian business, to continue to locate corporate offices in Canada, to guarantee participa-
tion of Canadians as directors or in management, and to make capital and other
investment expenditures in Canada. Foreign investors also may be required to add
Canadians to their own board of directors and to maintain or to establish a listing on
Canadian stock exchanges.
The year 2006 witnessed one of the most extensive ICA reviews undertaken to date,
involving the proposed acquisition by Xstrata plc (Xstrata) of Falconbridge Limited (Fal-
conbridge). Xstrata is a global natural resources group based in Switzerland; 31 Falcon-
bridge was a Canadian-based mining company with worldwide operations in nickel,
copper, zinc, and aluminum production.3 2
Apart from the sheer size of the transaction (the largest successful all-cash offer in Ca-
nadian history),33 and the involvement of a sensitive Canadian resource sector, the situa-
tion was complicated by the fact that Xstrata's bid for Falconbridge was both unsolicited
and competed against an alternative friendly offer by Canadian-based Inco Limited
(Inco).34 This created an unusual level of political and public interest in the transaction,
given that it pitted a potential foreign takeover against a made-in-Canada solution.
Because Inco is a Canadian company, its offer for Falconbridge did not have to secure
ICA approval. However, Inco had become embroiled in a protracted and difficult review
process of its own involving competition authorities in the European Union (EU) and, to
a somewhat lesser extent, in the United States. 35 This led to calls in Canada for a "level
regulatory playing field" (i.e., that the Minister of Industry should at the very least with-
hold ICA approval for Xstrata's bid until Inco received its foreign antitrust approvals so as
not to give Xstrata an "unfair" advantage over Inco). Indeed, in an unprecedented step,
the Standing Committee on Industry, Science, and Technology of Canada's House of
Commons convened a special meeting at which a unanimous motion to this effect was
adopted. 36
Xstrata ultimately obtained its ICA approval in July 2006, following an extension of the
initial forty-five day review period (and also after Inco had received its EU and U.S. anti-
trust clearances). According to a press release issued by Xstrata at the time, the undertak-
ings it provided to satisfy the net benefit test included the following commitments:
31. See Xstrata plc, Group Information, http://www.xstrata.com/corporate.php.
32. See Falconbridge Limited, Corporate Profile, http://archive.xstrata.com/falcombridge/.
33. Canada: Foreign Investment Drives M&A, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Dec. 2006, at I ("Swiss-based Xstrata
finalized its $21.2 billion takeover of Falconbridge, the largest all-cash offer in Canadian history, after rival
Canadian bidder Inco was itself bought by Brazil's CVRD for $17 billion.").
34. Christopher J. Chipello, Into Drops Bid for Fakonbridge and Clear the Way for Xstrata, WA.LL ST. J., July
29, 2006, at A2.
35. Bernard Simon, Into Bid Faces EU and US Scrutiny, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2006, at 26.
36. CANADA, HOUSE OF COMMONS, STANDING COMMrrTEE ON INDUSTRY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOL-
ocy, EVIDENCE, (Issue No. 6, June 1, 2006), 39th Par., 1st Session, 2006. OITAWA: PUBLIC WORKS AND
GOVERNMFNT SERVICES, 2006, available at http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/Committee/391/INDU/
Evidence/EV2245507/IND UEV06-E.PDF.
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* establishment of a new standalone global nickel business, headquartered in To-
ronto, Ontario, with both the CEO and a majority of senior management consist-
ing of Canadians;
" establishment of a new technology research and development unit based in
Sudbury, Ontario;
" establishment of new regional head offices for Xstrata's copper and zinc business
units, to be located in Toronto, Ontario, with the COO and a majority of senior
officers consisting of Canadians;
* establishment in Canada of Xstrata's global headquarters for copper recycling;
* prohibition against layoffs of operating staff for three years at any of Falcon-
bridge's operating facilities in Canada;
* increased capital, R&D, and exploration expenditures in Canada;
* identification of a potential Canadian candidate for the position of non-executive
director of Xstrata; and
* funding for community and social initiatives in Canada, with a particular focus on
supporting aboriginal communities. 37
Three days after Xstrata received ICA approval, Inco announced that it had allowed its
bid for Falconbridge to expire. 38 Xstrata subsequently acquired control of Falconbridge in
mid-August, 2006.39
B. THE "HOLLOWING OUT" OF CORPORATE CANADA-MYTH OR REALITY?
One of the arguments raised by opponents of Xstrata's takeover of Falconbridge was
that the acquisition would contribute to the hollowing out of the Canadian corporate
sector. This is a long-standing objection to foreign acquisitions of Canadian businesses.
Proponents of this view argue that foreign takeovers lead to the elimination of Canadian
head offices, resulting in a direct loss of head office employment-particularly senior
management functions-as well as a reduction in demand for ancillary financial, legal and
other services.
A study released by Statistics Canada in July 2006, however, found that these concerns
may not be valid. 40 Looking at the data for the years 1999 to 2005, the study reported that
foreign takeovers have not had a negative impact on employment in Canadian head of-
fices. Instead, more head offices were actually created than were closed as a result of
foreign takeovers, and there was a net increase in levels of head office employment. 4' By
37. See Press Release, Xstrata Plc., Xsrrata Receives Investment Canada Act Approval (July 25, 2006), avail-
able at http://www.xstrata.com/news/200607251.en.pdf.
38. See Press Release, Inco Ltd., Inco's Offer for Falconbridge Expires; Focus Shifts to Two-way Combina-
tion with Phelps Dodge (July 28, 2006), available at http://www.inco.com/newscentre/newsreleases/default.
aspxposting-id=3746.
39. See Press Release, Xstrata Plc, Xstrata Acquires Additional 67.8% of Falconbridge and Extends Offer to
25 August 2006 (Aug.15, 2006), available at http://www.xstrata.com/press-release.php?id=AC&nb=2006081
51 .en.html.
40. See Desmond Beckstead & W. Mark Brown, Head Ofice Employment in Canada, 1999 to 2005, STATIs-
"-ncS CANADA, July 13, 2006, available at http://www.statscan.ca/english/research/I 1-624-MIE/ 1-62 4-MIE2
006014.pdf.
41. Id. at 10.
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contrast, firms that went from foreign to Canadian control experienced a decline in head
office employment.42
Indeed, more generally, the report concluded that much of the dynamism in Canada's
head office sector is generated by foreign-controlled firms.43 Thus, between 1999 and
2005, foreign firms accounted for all of the growth in the number of head offices in Ca-
nada and the majority of the gains in head office employment.
These findings have important implications for the debate surrounding foreign invest-
ment in Canada. The fact that foreign control does not necessarily lead to a reduction in
head office employment, or senior management input, appears to undercut at least one
argument against restricting foreign investment in Canadian businesses.
C. POSSIBLE AMENDMENTS?
Not surprisingly, the minority Conservative government currently in power in Canada
appears to encourage, rather than discourage, foreign investment. This has led the gov-
ernment to announce that it will undertake a review of the ICA to ensure that it is in line
with best practices in other jurisdictions and maximizes the benefits of foreign investment
while retaining Canada's ability to protect its national interests.
The government's commitment to review the ICA is set out in a document entitled
Advantage Canada, which was released by Canada's Department of Finance on November
23, 2006.44 Advantage Canada describes the government's long-term plan for making Ca-
nada a "true world economic leader." Based on the tenor of the comments in Advantage
Canada, it appears that the government's intention is to generally reduce the scope or
application of the ICA except in certain circumstances. For example, the plan suggests
that one instance in which government intervention may be justified is when a large, state-
owned enterprise with noncommercial objectives and unclear corporate governance and
reporting procedures attempts to acquire a Canadian business.
This latter point is likely a reference to the concerns that were raised when state-owned
China Minmetals Corporation sought to acquire Noranda, Inc. in 2005.45 The Minmetals
transaction did not proceed, but the former Liberal government introduced proposed
amendments to the ICA to ensure that the Minister would be able to review (and block)
transactions on national security grounds.46 The Liberals were defeated before these
amendments could be passed, but it appears that the minority conservative government
now intends to consider similar provisions as part of its ICA review. If adopted, this
would put Canada in line with other major trading partners, such as the United States,
that also permit the screening of foreign investments for reasons of national security.
42. Id. at 11.
43. Id. at 15.
44. Press Release, Department of Finance, Canada, Canada's New Government Releases Advantage Ca-
nada: An Economic Plan to Eliminate Canada's Net Debt and Further Reduce Taxes, (Nov. 23, 2006), availa-
ble at http://www.fin.gc.ca/newsO6/06-069e.html.
45. See generally Aaron A. Dhir, Of Takeovers, Foreign Investment and Human Rights: Unpacking the Noranda-
Minmetals Conundrum, 22 BANKING & FIN. L. REv. 77 (Oct. 2006).
46. Bill C-59, An Act to Amend the Investment Canada Act, 1st Session, 38th Parliament, 2005 (First
Reading: June 20, 2005), available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/contentlhoc/Bills/381/Government/C-59/C-59-
1/C-59_l.PDF.
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D. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP RESTRICTIONS IN CANADIAN TELECOM
On March 22, 2006, the government-appointed Telecommunications Policy Review
Panel (the Panel) issued its final report on Canada's telecommunications industry.47 The
Panel was formed to assess and provide recommendations with respect to the institutional
and regulatory framework governing the Canadian telecom industry.
One of the areas the Panel examined was the issue of foreign investment limits. The
Panel concluded that the current limits, including a 20 percent cap on direct foreign own-
ership of common telecom carriers, are among the most restrictive and inflexible in the
OECD.48 Given the benefits of expanded investment in Canadian telecoms, especially in
emerging markets, the Panel recommended replacing Canada's current foreign ownership
restrictions with a more flexible public interest test.49 The new test would assess potential
foreign investments based on a variety of factors, including improved competition, better
service and innovation, head office location and functions, R&D, employment, public
safety, and national security.5 0 The Panel also urged that any relaxation of foreign invest-
ment rules be applied consistently and in a competitively neutral way to both the telecom
and broadcasting industries. 51
IV. Canadian Bilateral Investment Treaties and Disputes
A number of developments during 2006 made this a particularly active and significant
year for Canadian bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and disputes. Over the last decade,
BITs have quickly emerged as a viable option for businesses seeking protection of their
investments in foreign jurisdictions. Traditionally, when investment disputes arose, for-
eign investors were limited to seeking remedies through either the host country's domes-
tic court system or diplomatic claims. The BITs are an attractive alternative because they
provide a mechanism to pursue damages claims directly against host states through inter-
national arbitration. This is reflected in the phenomenal growth in the negotiation of
these agreements worldwide. In 1989, there were less than 400 BITs in force and by the
end of 2005, that number increased to approximately 2,500.52
A. NEW CANADA-PERU BIT
On November 14, 2006, Canada and Peru signed a BIT, otherwise referred to in Ca-
nada as a Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement (FIPA).53 This is
Canada's first BIT to be negotiated in eight years and the first to be based on Canada's
new Model FIPA. This will bring the number of BITs Canada has with developing and
47. The Panel's report is available at http://www.telecomreview.ca/epic/internet/intprp-gecrt.nsf/vwapj/re-
porte.pdf/$FILE/reporte.pdf.
48. Id. at 11-13-11-14.
49. Id. at 11-25-11-26.
50. Id. at 11-25.
51. Id. at 11-26.
52. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Developments in International Investment Agreements in
2005, HA Monitor No. 2 (2006), UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/A12006/7.
53. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Nov. 14, 2006, Can-Peru, available at
http://www.maeci-dfait.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/Canada-Peru 1OnovO6-en.pdf.
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newly industrialized countries to twenty-three.54 Canada is currently in the process of
active BIT negotiations with Jordan, India, and China. Negotiations with Jordan have just
commenced and those with India are near completion. Although negotiations with China
have presented challenges, it is expected that they will be concluded in 2007. Exploratory
discussions are also in the works with Indonesia, Vietnam and Kuwait and the launching of
formal negotiations is expected to follow in the next few months. 55
The Canada-Peru BIT closely mirrors the 2004 Model FIPA, with a few exceptions,
and is comprised of fifty-two articles and fifty pages of reservations and exceptions. 56 It
has three core substantive obligations:
" Nondiscriminatory treatment: Foreign investors and their investments must be ac-
corded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to domestic investors (na-
tional treatment) and investors from any other country (most-favored-nation
treatment or MFN treatment);5 7
" Fair and equitable treatment: Foreign investments must be accorded fair and equita-
ble treatment in accordance with international law, including full protection and
security;5s and
* Compensation for expropriation: Expropriation, or measures equivalent to expropria-
tion, must be for a public purpose, nondiscriminatory, in accordance with due pro-
cess of law, and accompanied by payment of prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation.5 9
Certain obligations contained in the Canada-Peru BIT, however, differ from those con-
tained in other Canadian BITs. These changes arise in at least five key substantive areas of
investment protection:
" The scope of protected investments has been narrowed in contrast to the broad
and open-ended asset-based definition found in previous BITs; the definition now
consists of a closed list of qualified investments and specifically excludes certain
assets;
60
" Reference to the "returns of investors" is absent from the operative provisions of
the Canada-Peru BIT, including the provisions concerning fair and equitable treat-
ment, expropriation, national treatment, and MFN treatment; as a result, challeng-
ing host government measures which significantly impact returns but not the
underlying investment itself could be more difficult;
54. Canada has concluded BITs with the following countries (entry into force date): Russia (1989); Poland
(1990); Czech Republic (1992); Slovak Republic (1992); Argentina (1993); Hungary (1992); Ukraine (1995);
Latvia (1995); the Philippines (1996); Trinidad & Tobago (1996); Barbados (1997); Ecuador (1997); Egypt
(1997); Romania (1997); Venezuela (1998); Panama (1998); Thailand (1998); Armenia (1999); Uruguay
(1999); Lebanon (1999); Costa Rica (1999); and Croatia (2001).
55. Current information on Canada's regional and bilateral initiatives is available on the website of Foreign
Affairs & International Trade Canada, http://www.international.gc.ca/ma-nac/reg-en.asp.
56. Canada's existing BIT; typically contain less than twenty articles and few reservations and exceptions.
57. Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Nov. 14, 2006, Can.-Peru, arts. 3, 4 &
Annex B.4.
58. Id. at art. 5.
59. Id. at art. 13 & Annex B.13(l).
60. Id. at art. 1.
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" Broad MFN exceptions available to host governments significantly limit the ability
of investors to benefit from the host government's MEN obligations, including the
potential to benefit from more favorable treaties negotiated by the host with third
countries; 61
" Fair and equitable treatment is limited to treatment accorded to covered invest-
ments in accordance with the "customary international law minimum standard of
treatment of aliens"; 62 although this is an evolving area of the law, host govern-
ments have argued that the "customary international law" standard represents a
higher threshold for demonstrating breach than the "international law" standard of
treatment generally provided for in Canada's existing BITs; and
" Clarifications of what may constitute expropriation, including indirect expropria-
tion, may lead to a tolerance of a wider range of regulatory interference that has
the effect of significantly diminishing, but not completely destroying, an invest-
ment's value.6 3
The Canada-Peru BIT also modifies and supplements a number of other provisions
contained in Canada's existing BITs. These include those dealing with investor-state dis-
pute settlement, prudential measures and financial services, national security, public access
to hearings and documents, and participation by non-disputing parties.
As Canada's first BIT in eight years, and as the first to be based on the 2004 Model
FIPA, the negotiation of the Canada-Peru BIT represents a watershed moment in the
development of Canada's BITs. Arguably, the protections to investors under this treaty
have been significantly diluted when compared to Canada's existing BITs. This is likely a
reaction by the Canadian government to its role as a respondent in several NAFTA Chap-
ter 11 cases.
B. FUTURE BIT NEGOTIATIONS
In addition to Jordan, India, China, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Kuwait, Canada has iden-
tified the following countries for future BITs: Dominican Republic, Hong Kong, Algeria,
Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Mongolia, Paraguay, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates. The
Canadian government is considering streamlining the obligations contained in the Model
FIPA and is currently consulting with the Canadian business community.
C. ENCANA CORP. V. REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR
The UNCITRAL Tribunal award in EnCana Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case
No. UN3481, February 3, 2006, (Canada-Ecuador BIT) is the first award to be issued in
an investor-state dispute brought under a Canadian BIT.64
The dispute arose out of a denial by the Ecuadorian tax authorities (Servicios de Rentas
Internas or SRI) of value-added tax (VAT) refunds to EnCana's subsidiaries incorporated
in Barbados and operating in Ecuador under a series of participation contracts entered
61. Id. at art. 4 & Annex B.4.
62. Id. at art. 5.
63. Id. at art. 13 & Annex B.13(1).
64. The award is available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Encana-EquadorAward.pdf.
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into with Petroecuador, the Ecuadorian State oil company, for the exploration and pro-
duction of oil.65 Under the contracts, EnCana received a percentage of the oil extracted,
called the "participation factor," depending on the level of output. For a short time, the
SRI granted refunds of the VAT paid in connection with the production of oil for export.
The SRI then changed its policy and began denying VAT refunds for foreign oil compa-
nies for several reasons that included issues of legislative interpretation and a claim that
the VAT had already been reimbursed through the participation factor. EnCana's princi-
pal claims before the Tribunal were that Ecuador's actions breached the expropriation, fair
and equitable treatment, and national treatment provisions of the BIT.66 Upon bringing
its BIT claim, proceedings brought by EnCana's subsidiaries in the Ecuadorian courts
were withdrawn. 67
The Tribunal determined that the claim concerned a tax measure, and, therefore, it only
had jurisdiction to consider the expropriation claim. 68 Under the BIT, only the expropri-
ation provision could be applied to a tax measure. 69 In a split decision, the majority of the
Tribunal, Professor James Crawford (President), and Christopher Thomas rejected both
the direct and indirect expropriation claims. The majority proceeded on the assumption
that EnCana's subsidiaries had a right to VAT refunds under Ecuadorian law but held that
this right was not expropriated by Ecuador. In terms of indirect expropriation, the Tribu-
nal held that foreign investors have neither the right nor legitimate expectation that the
tax regime will not change and that only in extreme cases will the incidence of a tax mea-
sure constitute indirect expropriation. 70
According to the Tribunal, issues of indirect expropriation arise "only if a tax law is
extraordinary, punitive in amount or arbitrary in incidence." 71 The Tribunal concluded
that notwithstanding a certain degree of financial impairment, EnCana's subsidiaries were
able to continue to operate and EnCana was not denied "in whole or in significant part"
the benefits of its investment.72 In terms of direct expropriation, the Tribunal held that in
order for an expropriation claim to be made out, the actions of an executive agency, such
as a tax authority, must amount to "an actual and effective repudiation of legal rights."73
The majority was of the view that an expropriation does not occur until the executive
agency has made a "definitive determination contrary to law." 74
The dissenting arbitrator found that Ecuador had expropriated EnCana's returns on
investment and that EnCana was entitled to compensation. 75 He criticized the majority
for effectively reading in a requirement for the exhaustion of local remedies under the
65. Id. 9123.
66. Id. 91 107.
67. Id. 91 102.
68. Id. 9191 47, 149.
69. The Ecuadorian and Canadian tax authorities did not exercise the option available to them under the
BIT to jointly veto the expropriation claim.
70. Id. 91 173.
71. Id. 9 177.
72. Id.
73. Id. 9 195.
74. Id. 91 194.
75. The Partial Dissenting Opinion is available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Encana-
Eqnador PartialDissent.pdf.
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expropriation provision of the BIT.76 He further noted that the BIT provides for the
opposite in that it "precludes the possibility for the foreign investor to pursue or continue
claims regarding measures challenged under the Treaty before the national courts or au-
thorities of the host state." 77
Although the governing UNCITRAL Rules provide that in principle the costs of arbi-
tration shall be borne by the unsuccessful party, the Tribunal ordered otherwise, holding
that it would be just and equitable for Ecuador to bear the costs of arbitration.78 Ecuador
was ordered to reimburse EnCana for over $300,000 for the costs of arbitration. 79
V. The Proceeds Of Crime (Money Laundering) And Terrorist Financing
Act
On October 5, 2006, the Harper government introduced a bill to amend The Proceeds
of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act (PCMLTFA).80 The
PCMLTFA was passed by the Canadian Parliament in the immediate aftermath of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, with the aim to strengthen the reporting of suspicious transactions by
financial intermediaries to the newly created Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis
Center of Canada (FINTRAC).81 The proposed bill now seeks to extend the reach of
FINTRAC by enhancing client identification and record-keeping measures for financial
institutions and intermediaries, identified as banks, trust and loan companies, life insur-
ance companies, securities dealers and casinos.82 It would require the covered institutions
and intermediaries to: monitor transactions by foreign nationals and members of their
immediate families who hold prominent public positions;83 report attempted suspicious
transactions;84 create a federal registration system for money service businesses and for-
eign exchange dealers; 85 extend the amount of information FINTRAC can disclose;86 and
expand information sharing between federal departments and agencies.87
Significantly, the proposed legislation would remove the requirement in the current law
that legal counsel file suspicious transaction reports or other prescribed transaction re-
ports.88 That requirement has been subject to numerous legal challenges, and the Cana-
dian courts have issued injunctions excluding legal counsel from the application of the act
76. Id. 28.
77. Id. 29.
78. id. at Award, 202.
79. Id. 1 203.
80. See Press Release, Department of Finance, Government of Canada, Canada's New Government
Toughens Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Financing Regime (Oct. 5, 2006), available at http://
www.news.gc.ca/cftnx/view/en/indes.jsp.?articleid=244019. The text of the bill, as introduced in Parliament,
is available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Docid=2384496&file=4.
81. See The Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act, 2001 S.C., ch. 41 (Can.).
82. Bill C-25, An Act to Amend the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act
and the Income Tax Act and to Make a Consequential Amendment to Another Act (Oct. 5, 2006).
83. Id. 9 8 (amending PCMLTFA § 9).
84. Id. 5 (amending PCMLTFA § 7).
85. Id. 10 (amending PCMLTFA §11).
86. Id. 26, 27 (amending PCMLTFA §§ 55, 56).
87. Id.
88. Id. 1 9 (amending PCMLTFA § 10).
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and regulations in several provinces. 89 The courts, however, did not get an opportunity to
address the merits of the claims; following the injunctions, the Canadian Government
excluded lawyers from the regulations that required them to report suspicious monetary
transactions.90 The proposed amendment to PCMLTFA would now remove this require-
ment from the statute.
VI. New Legislation Amending The Ontario Securities Act
On December 31, 2005, amendments to the Ontario Securities Act went into effect,
establishing, for the first time in Canada, statutory liability for secondary market disclo-
sure by public companies and its executives. 91 The new law may make it easier for share-
holders to sue public companies and their executives for misleading or untrue statements
in public documents, and its effect is not limited to companies operating in Ontario. Al-
berta and Manitoba already have followed Ontario's lead, introducing the same legislation
verbatim in 2006. British Columbia is planning to introduce its own version, which in
important respects is different from Ontario's law, creating fears of litigation arbitrage
across Canada. 92
The new law extends the statutory liability for misrepresentation found in corporate
documents. 93 Previously, misrepresentation would give rise to statutory liability only if
found in certain documents, such as an annual report. The new law extends the reach of
statutory liability to misrepresentation found in essentially any corporate document-even
a press release. 94 The law does, however, distinguish between core and non-core docu-
ments in terms of the burden of proof required to succeed on such a claim.95 If alleged
misrepresentation is demonstrated in a core document, for example a prospectus, the de-
fending company would bear the burden of showing it conducted a reasonable investiga-
tion to ensure information was accurate. 96 Misrepresentation in a non-core document
such as a press release would require a showing that the defendant had knowledge of the
misrepresentation. 97 Moreover, the new law does provide some protection against frivo-
lous claims-plaintiffs are required to obtain leave from the court in order to file a claim
and there is a cap on the damages.98
89. Fed'n of Law Societies of Canada v. Canada, 2002 C.R.D. 81.60.00-03 (court in Nova Scotia granted
injunction to legal counsel); Fed'n of Law Societies of Canada v. Canada, 2002 A.C.W.S. LEXIS 2693 (2002)
(court in Saskatchewan grants interim relief to legal counsel); Fed'n of Law Societies of Canada v. Canada,
2002 T.L.W.D. LEXIS 20 (Ont. S.C.J. 2002) (Ontario court grants injunction to legal counsel).
90. See Sam Porteous, Lawyers Must Not Be Erempt from Ottawa's New Anti-Money-Laundering Legislation,
Says Security Analyst Sam Porteous, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Apr. 1, 2003, at A17.
91. These amendments were originally part of an omnibus bill-Keeping the Promise for a Strong Econ-
omy Act (Budget Measures), 2002--commonly known as Bill 198. Bill 198 was introduced in Ontario in
2002 and, with certain exceptions, entered into force in April 2003. Keeping the Promise for a Strong Econ-
omy Act (Budget Measures), 2002, S.O. 2002, ch. 22 - Bill 198.
92. See Sandra Rubin, Forum Shopping Fears: Alarm Bells Are Ringing in the Eecutive Suites of Listed Corpora-
tions over B.C.'s Plan to Adopt Its Own Shareholder Class-Action Regime, FINANCIAL POST, Sept. 20, 2006.
93. See Ontario Securities Act, Pt. XXIII.I.
94. Id. § 138.3.
95. Id. § 138.4.
96. Id. §§ 138.4(6)-(7).
97. Id. § 138.4(1).
98. Id. §§ 138.7-8.
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VII. Supreme Court Of Canada**
A. TRADEMARK DECISIONS
On June 2, 2006, the Supreme Court of Canada issued two landmark decisions, one
involving an iconic figure of pop culture, Barbie dolls, 99 and the other, the venerable
champagne house, Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin. 00 In both cases, the owners of the interna-
tionally established trademarks lost. The unanimous decisions upheld the right of
"Barbie's," a small chain of Montreal-based -restaurants, and "Cliquot," the name used by a
group of women's wear shops in Quebec and Eastern Ontario, to use their names as regis-
tered Canadian trademarks.
In the Barbie case, it was contended by Mattel, Inc., the owner of the trademark
"Barbie" in association with dolls and accessories, that there was a likelihood that consum-
ers would think that the restaurants had something to do with the dolls, and hence the
restaurants should not be permitted to register the name "Barbie" as a Canadian trade-
mark in association with restaurants. In the Veuve Clicquot case, the champagne maker
alleged that not only was the registration of the Cliquot trademark by the women's cloth-
ing chain in association with the sale of mid-market women's clothing confusing with the
trademarks held by Veuve Clicquot, but that its use depreciated the goodwill inherent in
the Veuve Clicquot brand and trademark.
Both decisions were based principally on findings of fact. In Veuve Clicquot the Su-
preme Court accepted the trial judge's findings that ordinary consumers would be unlikely
to make any mental link between the trademarks and the respective wares and services of
the parties. Veuve Clicquot's depreciation argument was also dismissed by the court be-
cause it did not show that the women's boutique "made use of marks sufficiently similar to
Veuve Clicquot to evoke in a relevant universe of consumers a mental association of the
two marks that is likely to depreciate the value of the goodwill attaching to [Veuve Clic-
quot's] mark." l0'
Similarly, in the Barbie case, the restaurant owner had to demonstrate that use of both
trademarks in the same geographic area would not create the likelihood of confusion (i.e.,
mistaken inferences in the marketplace). The court concluded that "although a trade-
mark's fame is capable of carrying the mark across product lines where lesser marks would
be circumscribed to their traditional wares or services," each situation must be judged in
its full factual context.' 02 Accordingly, the court ruled that since the "Barbie" trademark
had not transcended outside dolls and doll accessories, there was no likelihood of confu-
sion in the marketplace.
** The information in this section was previously published on June 7, 2006, under the title, "What
Would the Harried Consumer Think-Supreme Court Landmark Trade-mark Decisions," at the Davies,
Ward, Phillips & Vineberg LLP website, www.dwpv.com.
99. Mattel, Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., [20061 2006 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 2678.
100. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee en 1772 v. Boutiques Cliquot Ltee., [2006] 2006 A.C.W.S.J.
LEXIS 2677.
101. Veuve Clicquot, [20061 2006 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 2677.
102. Mattel, [20061 2006 A.C.W.SJ. LEXIS 2678.
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